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INTRODUCTION
The emerging economies'  crisis stress repeatedly the risks associated  with the
international  financial system.  Excessive volatility of capital  flows exacerbates the
structural weaknesses of these economies, especially in the banking system.  Thus, policy
makers  are urged to reassess banking supervision and regulation.  However,  this cannot
go without a clearer understanding of the interaction between banks and other
components  of the financial structure to define  future strategies.
Recent studies  show indeed that contractual savings have become important  actors of
financial systems in developed  and also in a handful of emerging economies (e.g.,  Chile,
South Africa).  They are also growing at a fast pace in several Latin American  countries
(e.g., Argentina,  Mexico) and demographic  evolution may increase the benefits
associated to a funded system in other countries.  Impavido and Musalem (2000) and
Catalan, Impavido and Musalem (2000) show that the development of institutional
investors, in particular contractual  savings, partly explain the rapid expansion of stock
markets  over the past 15 years.  Impavido, Musalem  and Tressel (2001)  show moreover
that the development  and asset allocation of contractual savings have had an independent
impact on firms'  financing choices  after controlling  for macroeconomic  and firms'
characteristics.  They identify several channels.  In market-based  economies,  an increase
in the proportion of shares  in the portfolio of contractual  savings  leads to a decline in
firms'  leverage.  In bank-based economies,  instead, an increase in the size of contractual
savings is associated with an increase in leverage and debt maturity in the corporate
sector.  This suggests  that firms are more resilient to refinancing or bankruptcy risks.
However, while the banking system plays  a crucial role in most economies as it
provides external  finance to firms excluded from the securities market,  the interaction
between contractual  savings institutions and banks and its implications on the cost of
capital for the firms has not been assessed yet.
Impavido,  Musalem and Tressel (2001) propose several mechanisms through which
contractual  savings interact with the banking sector and that are consistent with their
results.  First, contractual savings, as competing  intermediaries,  may increase  the
efficiency of the banking sector.  Underwriting costs may also decrease,  thus lowering
the cost of access to capital markets.  Moreover,  banks may respond to more intense
competition by concentrating on their core comparative  advantage - that is their superior
ability to monitor firms - and increase short-term loans.  As bank liabilities  are liquid, this
may reduce the balance sheet mismatch of the banking sector.  Second,  contractual
savings institutions may also be complementary  to banks.  Indeed,  banks may  for
instance  issue long-term securities bought by contractual savings  institutions, or the latter
could invest in long term bank deposits.  As a result, the term-transformation  risk in the
banking sector may decrease.  The development of contractual  savings institutions  may
therefore  increase the stability and efficiency of the banking system when adequate
regulation and supervision are effective.
This paper provides a first step in providing a better understanding on the impact of
contractual  savings development on the banking system.  First, we provide a discussion
of the potential channels through which the development of contractual  savings
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institutions might affect the efficiency and stability of the banking system.  Second, using
bank level data across countries  we provide regression  analysis on panel data in order to
assess the impact on contractual savings on bank efficiency and lending behavior.  We
concentrate on profitability measures and on term transformation  and credit risks
indicators.
I  INTERACTION BETWEEN  CONTRACTUAL  SAVINGS
INSTITUTIONS  AND BANKS
In this section, we discuss the potential mechanisms  through which the development of
contractual savings institutions might affect the banking system.  We want to address two
main questions.  First, does the development of contractual savings institutions  increase
or decrease  the competitive pressures on banks? In other words, are banks and contractual
savings institutions substitute or complementary?  Second, does the development of
contractual savings institutions enhance the stability of the banking system?
The broad movement of financial  liberalization  that started in the early eighties has
deeply modified the functioning of banking systems in many countries.  Increased
competitive pressures may increase efficiency of the banking system, but may also
increase instability when proper regulation and supervision is not set.  Surprisingly,  few
studies have analyzed the efficiency,  profitability and balance sheets of banks on a cross-
country basis 1. In particular,  whereas financial  liberalization was often associated to
competitive pressures from non-bank  financial  institutions, there has been, to date, no
attempt to analyze both empirically and theoretically the interaction between the banking
system and other financial  institutions (except the stock market)2.
First, we want to assess whether the development of contractual  savings institutions has
increased the competitive pressures on the banking system, and more particularly how the
behavior of banks has been affected, across countries and over time.  In doing so, we
want to assess the specific impact of contractual savings, after controlling  for banks'
characteristics,  financial sector development,  and the macroeconomic environment.
Contractual savings institutions will act as competing  suppliers of funds, hence
competitive pressure  on the banking systems will increase, either indirectly or directly.
Contractual savings institutions  will indirectly increase  competitive pressures because the
development of contractual  savings  institutions  is associated to the development  and
increased liquidity of the capital markets (Impavido  and Musalem (2000)).  The cost of
issuing securities will decrease3, hence  reducing the market power of banks4. Moreover,
contractual  savings  institutions may increase the supply of public information on capital
market and have positive spillover effects  on the monitoring of borrowers by banks.  In
1  See, however, Demirguc-Kunt  and Huizinga  (1999a, 1999b),  Davis and Tuori (2001)  and Claessens,
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001).
2 Allen and Santomero (1999) claim that the broad movement towards more market finance,  that was
initiated in the 80s, has led to a greater importance  of  non-bank financial  intermediation.
Underwriting costs may decrease, as argued by Vittas (i 999) and the supply of funds will increase on
capital  markets.
4See Rajan (1992)  who analyzes the welfare gains of increasing firms'  outside financial opportunities.  See
also Petersen and Rajan (1995).
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addition, the development of contractual  savings institutions will directly  increase  the
competitive  pressures on the barking  system.  First, they will compete on the saving side
(for instance, in France,  the development of life insurance  over the past  10 years has
implied a significant reallocation  of savings from more "classic" banking  savings
instruments).  Second,  they will compete on the lending side, either directly  or indirectly,
by increasing the demand for securities  on the primary markets.  Hence,  we should expect
to observe  an impact on banks behavior.  Competition, however, will be two-dimensional.
First, competition will be in price, thus we should expect a decrease  in bank net interest
margins  as contractual  savings institutions develop.  Second,  banks may modify the
maturity of their loans.  As contractual savings institutions have a comparative  advantage
in suplying long-term finance 5, banks  may decrease the maturity of their loans6.
Therefore, one might expect to observe a decrease  in the maturity of bank loans.
However, contractual savings  institutions may also be complementary  to banks.  First,
as noticed by Demirguc-Kunt and  Maksimovic  (1996), banks and stock markets may be
complementary7. Information  disclosure requirements  and generally the increased
transparency  associated to capital market development may stimulate  the monitoring
activity of banks8, lowering the credit risk borne by the banking sector9; an increase  in
bank lending and total profitability may be observed as capital markets develop.  Second,
contractual  savings institutions may provide long-term resources  to banks,  thus reducing
the interest rate and liquidity risk in the banking system by limiting the term
transformation activity of banks  10 Therefore the maturity of bank loans may increase if
such complementarity effects  dominate.
Second, the development of contractual  savings institutions may increase  the stability
of the banking system,  thus reducing systemic  risks that may potentially  lead to banking
crisis 1 1 . This would be the case if the development of contractual  savings institutions
reduces the risks borne by the banking sector.  First, credit risk may be reduced if the
development of contractual  savings institutions leads directly  or indirectly to an increase
in bank monitoring.  Second,  the development of contractual  savings institutions may
reduce interest rate risks and liquidity risks associated to the term transformation  of assets
realized in the banking system.  On the one hand, as noticed in the previous paragraph,  if
5 Contractual  savings institutions have long-term  liabilities.
6The maturity choice is also affected by monitoring decisions (Stiglitz and Rey (1993)).
7 Bank and market finance are complementary  also because they finance different  segments of the firm
population:  see Diamond (1991), Bolton and Freixas (2000)  among others.
8However, the theoretical  relation  between stock market transparency,  liquidity,  and monitoring of firms
by claimants (banks or investors)  is not clear-cut as first illustrated by Grossman and Stiglitz (1984).  See
also Holmstromand Tirole (1993).
9 Davis (2001) stresses the "multiple  avenues" of financial  systems by comparing aggregate net flows of
bank loans and market debt finance.
10  Following Diamond and Dybvig  (1983), systemic risk in the banking  system has been identified as a
consequence of maturity transformation  and the "sequential service"  constraint on bank liabilities; in
addition, imperfect information and moral hazard  increase this fragility of the banking system (Chen
(1999)).  Freixas and Rochet (1997) provide  a guidebook to microeconomic  theories of banking.
1l  Increased competitive pressures and financial stability are not incompatible. For a recent theoretical
analysis,  see for instance Koskela and Stenbacka (2000) who show that loan market competition,  which
leads to a reduction  of lending rates and higher investments without increasing the equilibrium bankruptcy
risk of firms. In addition, whether a reduction in term transformation risk in the banking system leads  to
more  or less efficient  lending decisions is an empirical question.
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contractual  savings institutions are competitors to banks, the latter may indeed respond to
competitive pressures by concentrating  on their core comparative advantage (associated
to narrow banking), -that is their superior ability to monitor firms - and increase short-
term loans.  Banks will therefore  be able to avoid losses caused either by unexpected
increase in short-term interest rates or by sudden withdrawals.  On the other hand, if
contractual  savings institutions provide resources to the banking system (either in the
form of loans, deposits,  or by buying securities issued by banks), banks will be less
subject  to liquidity risks for a given level of long-term assets.  They may therefore
increase the supply of long-term loans 12,  Finally, the recent emerging economies'  crisis
have stressed the risks associated to short-term capital  flows.  Excessively  volatile capital
movements have exacerbated the structural weaknesses of these economies, that were
magnified by fragile banking systems 1 3. This financial risk is associated to the difficulty
(or impossibility)  for these economies  to borrow abroad in their own currencies,  and
long-term.  One of the solution  is to deepen domestic financial system in order to develop
domestic  sources of long-term finance  (see for instance Caballero (2001)), which is the
comparative  advantage of contractual savings.
The development of contractual savings  institutions, given adequate regulation and
supervision'4, may therefore  enhance the stability and efficiency of the banking system.
11  DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Il.A  Data
We use balance  sheet and income statement of commercial banks, aggregted by country
each year, from the Bankscope data base provided by IBCA.  We use an unbalanced
sample of banks over the period 1991-2000,  in order to maximize the time-series
dimension for each country.
The database  on contractual  savings is taken from Inpavido and Musalem (2000),
extended for several countries (Argentina,  Brazil, India and Mexico).  It includes
information  from different sources (including the OECD institutional  investors data 2000,
and national sources) on total assets, financial assets, and allocation of assets for pension
funds and insurance companies.
All other macroeconomic  variables are obtained from various  sources:  Datastream, the
World Development Indicators, the IMF International  Financial Statistics and the Bank
for Internationa I Settlement for bond markets  data.
12  Our results are consistent with this assertion.
13  See the recent  literature, such as Aghion, Banerjee and Bachetta (2000), Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2000), Chang and Velasco  (1999), Rodrik and Velasco (1999) and Deckle and Kletzer (2001).  For
empirical  analysis, see Demirguc-Kunt and Detriagache (1997,  1998, 2000) and Harwood et al. eds. (1999).
14  See Barth et al. (2001 ) for an  analysis of  the prudential regulation  of banks (see also Dewatripont  and
Tirole (1994)). Generally,  La Porta et al. (1997,  1998)  claim that laws are important determinants of cross-
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II.B  Definition of variables and empirical strategy
We want to assess the impact of contractual savings institutions on banks' characteristics.
More specifically,  we analyze:  (i) profitability (ii) the maturity structure of loans, (iii)
credit risk, and (iv) the structure of liabilities.  We focus on pooled (GLS) estimates and
panel estimates  (GLS with fixed effects).  The GLS estimator corrects for
heteroschedasticity  specific to each panel (country). Fixed effects  estimations are
important in so far as they control for country specific regulatory  and supervision
characteristics that may partly explain the cross-country variation of our bank variables15
16
The dependent variables that we consider are:  (i) net interest margin (NIM), defined as
the accounting value of a bank's net interest income over total assets, (ii) profitability
(Profit), defined as profit before taxes over total assets17 18,  (iii) loan maturity defined as
short-term loans (with maturity less than one year) over total loans (STL), (iv) credit risk
proxied by loan loss provisions (over total assets, or over total loans), and (v) the
importance of short-term liabilities, proxied by customer + short-term funding (over total
assets).
The two first variables describe the profitability of banks, hence proxy for their
efficiency.  The NIM variable accounts  for banking spreads; this variable allows us to
assess whether banks pricing behavior may be affected by the development of contractual
savings institutions.  In addition, the NIM is also affected by the credit risk borne by the
banks.  The NIM variable is indeed an ex-post measure taking into account the realized
default rate.  For these reasons, we use also the Profit variable that accounts for all
sources of bank profits.
The  third variable  describes the maturity transformation  activity realized in the banking
system; more specifically, we want to test whether the development of contractual
savings institutions  has had an impact on the maturity of bank loans.  In other words, do
banks increase or decrease long-term  lending when contractual  savings  institutions
develop?
The fourth set of variables aim at describing the credit risk borne by the banks.  We use
two measures:  first, loan loss provisioning over total assets is the relevant variable to
understand the indirect  impact of contractual  savings on profitability via the reduction in
credit risk.  The second variable, loan loss provisions over total loans, roughly describes
the risk of the loan portfolio.
15 Fixed effects estimator use the time variation within countries to estimate partial correlations between  the
dependent and explanatory variables.
16  We also checked that our results are not affected by the inclusion of time dummies common to all
countries.
" See for instance Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999a, 1999b).
18  From the income statement,  we have the following accounting identity: Profit = NIM + non-interest
income / TA - overhead expenses / TA - loan loss provisioning / TA.
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We use three sets of explanatory  variables:  (i) banks'  characteristics,  (ii)
macroeconomic  factors, and (iii) financial  system characteristics' 9. All the relevant
variables  are expressed in percentages.
lI.B.1  Bank-specific characteristics
The first bank characteristic  is the book value of equity divided by total assets (ETA).
Recent studies (see for instance Demirgiiu-Kunt and Huizinga  (1999a,  1999b)  for cross-
country comparisons) show that there exists a positive relationship between bank
profitability and capitalization.  High capitalization and profitability may indeed reflect a
high franchise value (Caprio and Summers  (1993)). Moreover, well-capitalized banks
may face lower bankruptcy risks, thereby reducing  their costs of funding.  In addition,  we
want to control that loan maturity  is not explained by the structure of banks liabilities.
The second variable controlling  for the structure of bank liabilities is customer and
short-term funding over total assets.  It includes all short-term  and long-term  deposits
plus other non-deposit  short term funding.  Again, this variable  controls that loan
maturity is not driven by the structure of liabilities.  This is important in so far as we want
to test whether the development of contractual  savings institutions has an independent
impact on bank loan maturity that is not driven by other bank-specific  characteristics.
We include two variables describing the structure of bank activities.  The first one is
total loans over total assets.  The second one is non-interest earnings assets over total
assets.  Non- interest earnings assets are mainly cash and non-interest earnings  deposits at
other banks.
Finally, we control for overhead expenses, expressed  as a percentage of total assets.
This implies that differences  between net interest margin and profits before taxes are
explained by variations  in non- interest income (or taxes and provisions  for loan losses).
II.B.2  Macroeconomic  factors
Various  macroeconomic  factors may affect banks profitability  and loan maturity.  We use
the Log of GDP per capita as a broad measure of economic development.  Richer
economies have in general more efficient institutions,  a better compliance  with the legal
system in general, and with creditor rights, accounting  standards and transparency rules
(on the stock market)  in particular.  Moreover,  the inclusion of country fixed effects
further controls  for unobserved country-specific  regulation and supervision.  The
inflation rate is an indicator of both the government's management  of the economy and
whether  long-term contracting  is likely to be widespread.  It characterizes  also the
opportunity  cost of holding money.  We also include  government  fiscal balances (% GDP)
to control for the demand for public debt2O.
19  In order to provide comparable results, we choose explanatory variables  similar to those used by
Demirguci-Kunt and Huizinga (I 999a,  1999b).
20 We also used Government debt over GDP.  Our main results are not affected.  We choose not to report
these regressions because of the more limited country coverage.
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II.B.3  Financial system characteristics
The stock market and banking sector variables control that our contractual  savings
variables are not simply a proxy for the level of development of the financial  system and
2 1 the degree of competition between capital markets and banks
II.B.3.1  The stock market
First, we measure the size of stock markets by the stock market capitalization (in
percentage  of GDP).  This variable  has been widely used in the recent literature.  The
ability of the stock market to provide risk diversification opportunities  and information
also depends on  its level of activity and liquidity (Levine and Zervos (1998)).  Greater
liquidity will encourage investors to acquire stakes in risky firms22 and will enhance
information acquisition by large investors (Holmstrom and Tirole (1993)).  Greater
informational  content  in prices will increase  the efficiency of capital  allocation,  whereas
better public  information may have  a spillover effect on the long-term debt market by
reducing  initial  informational asymmetries,  as illustrated  in the model in Impavido,
Musalem and Tressel (2001). Activity in the stock market is measured  by total stock
traded over GDP and liquidity is proxied by the turnover ratio, that is the total value
traded, in proportion of the stock market capitalization.
II.B.3.2  The banking system
The degree of comp etition among banks, and between banks, capital markets  and other
non-bank financial  intermediaries depends on the level of development of the banking
system.  Moreover,  the tendency of banks to engage in long-term lending may also
depend on the deepening of the banking sector.  We use domestic credit provided by the
banking system over GDP as a proxy for the development and soundness of the banking
sector.
II.B.3.3  Contractual savings institutions
The level of development  of contractual  savings institutions is proxied either by
contractual savings financial  assets over GDP  or the log of contractual  savings
institutions financial assets over GDP.  The Log allows  to capture  non linearities if for
instance the impact of contractual  savings development  is larger for low initial levels of
development than for high initial levels of development.  Simple  scatter-plots  indeed
suggest the existence of such non- linearities  for NIM, profits,  and loan maturity.
II.B.4  Empirical strategy
We start with summary  statistics of the variables defined in the previous paragraph.  A
detailed description of the evolution of contractual savings institutions over the period
studied in our sample can be found in Impavido, Musalem and Tressel (2001).  Next, we
21 Whereas  the level of development and characteristics  of capital markets (and the size of the banking
sector) may affect bank profitability,  recent studies suggest that financial structure per se (that is the
relative importance  of capital markets and the banking  sector) has not additional impact (see  Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga (1999b), Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine  (1999) and Beck et al. (2000)).
And make efficient restructuring  decisions, see Maug (1998)  for a theoretical argument.
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compute simple correlations between the variables.  These simple statistics show a strong
correlation between the development of contractual savings  institutions and banks
characteristics.  Finally, we provide panel data analysis (GLS without and with fixed
effect estimates,  with a correction for heteroschedasticity).  Our bank level  data are
aggregated at the country level for each year.  The intersection  of the various data set
(Bankscope,  Institutional Investors Data base, and World Bank Indicators) provide a
sample of approximately 200 observations, and 8 years at best per country.
III  EMPIRICAL  RESULTS
lIMA Descriptive  statistics
Table 1 presents the sample of countries that are included in our contractual savings
database, and the total number of banks available for each country.  We have data for 34
countries,  including  13 emerging economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hungary, India,
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore,  South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Turkey).
The contractual savings data include  information on total financial assets and portfolio
composition for pension funds and insurance companies  (in particular corporate stocks),
except for 6 countries for which we have no information on equity investments (Austria,
Brazil, France, Japan,  Spain, and Turkey).  The Bankscope database has a very
comprehensive  coverage in most countries,  with banks included roughly  accounting for
90 % of total banking assets (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999)).
Table 2 provides the definition of the variables used in the regressions.  As described in
detail in Impavido,  Musalem  and Tressel (2001), there has been a spectacular increase23
in the total assets managed by pension funds and life insurance companies,24 25 relative to
GDP.  Expressed  in rate of growth, the increase is even more impressive.  Contractual
savings financial  assets, relative to GDP, have been growing at an average annual rate of
17.7%, 3.4%, 6.9%, 6.0%, 7.9%, 8.99% and 4.6% respectively  in France, Germany,
South Africa, the United States, the United Kingdom, Chile and Korea.  As shown by
Impavido and Musalem  (2000) and discussed also in Impavido, Musalem and Tressel
(2001), this development has been similar, in term of growth, to the development of
capital markets,  and may partly explain this evolution.
Table 3 provides simple descriptive statistics while Table 4 displays the correlation
between the main variables.  Net interest margins display some slight differences
between countries, when averaged over the period, with a maximum value of 7.71%  for
Turkey and a minimum of 1.05% in Switzerland.  Argentine banks are the most
capitalized, on average (14.62% of total assets), while Belgium ones are the least
capitalized (3.64%).  Banks have the highest proportion of loans  in their assets (72.7%) in
New Zealand,  while those in Brazil have the lowest proportion of loans (33.9%).  The
maturity  of loans exhibits also significant differences (we have the information on loan
23  Singapore is the only country in which contractual  savings assets decreased relative to GDP.
24  Musalem  and  Impavido (2000)  show,  on  this  sample  of countries,  that this explosion of contractual
savings institutions may partly explain the rapid growth of stock markets over the last 15 years.
25  In France, where pension funds are underdeveloped,  the life insurance industry exploded at the beginning
of the  90s  as  a  result  of strong  fiscal  incentives  to save  in  life-insurance  products (these  savings were
exempt of taxes).
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maturity structure only in 15 countries):  92.5%  of Greek banks loans are a maturity
below 1 year while on the contrary almost 80% of bans by Belgium banks have a
maturity above I year.  Table 4 finally shows that there is a strong negative correlation
between the net interest margin and the log of contractual savings  financial assets
(%GDP).  Note that the correlation is also negative and significant if we simply consider
contractual  savings  financial assets over GDP.  The proportion of short-term loans in total
bank loans is also strongly negatively correlated with LogcsfaGDP suggesting that the
development of contractual  savings institutions is associated  with an increase in loan
maturity.  The structure of liabilities does not seem to be significantly correlated with the
development of contractual savings26. Finally, credit risk seems to be negatively
correlated with the development of contractual  savings institutions.  Note the large cross-
country differences:  the top 4 countries in term of credit risk (LLTA) are Hungary
(2.36%), Argentina  (1.56%), Thailand (1.18%) and Brazil (1.16%), while banks face the
lowest credit risk in Germany  (0.06%), Austria (0.10%), Belgium (0.21%)  and Ireland
(0.24%).  In the former group, contractual savings  financial assets are 4.3% of GDP on
average, and 29.6% on average  in the latter group.  This suggests that contractual savings
may have some explanatory power for such cross-country differences.  The econometric
analysis will confirm its robustness.  This is consistent with conclusions drawn by
Impavido, Musalem and Tressel (2001).  Finally, Figures 1, 2 and 3 illustrate the
correlation between maturity of loans, net interest margin and credit risk, respectively,
with the development of contractual savings.
These simple statistics neither account for banks'  characteristics,  nor allow one to
conclude that the correlations are not the result of the correlation with stock market and
banks characteristics.  In the next section, we provide a simple econometric  analysis that
confirms that the correlation between banks'  profitability,  loan policy and the activity of
institutional investors  is not merely a function of banks' characteristics and other
macroeconomic  factors.
III.B Regression results
Table 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and  10 report regression results respectively for (1) the net interest
margin, (2) the profit rate, (3) the maturity of bank loans, (4) the credit risk (loan loss
provisions over total assets), (5) the credit risk proxied by loan loss provisions over total
loans, and (6) the structure of liabilities (customer and short-term  funding over total
assets).  For each dependent variable, we report OLS and within (fixed effect) estimates.
In each case, time dummies are included (not displayed  in the tables), and we include the
full set of control variables described in the previous sections.  Moreover,  we controlled
for the potential simultaneity bias between the dependent  variable and the contractual
savings variable  in two ways:  first, we use the lagged contractual savings variable;
second, we instrumented the contractual  saving variable by its lagged value and a set of
lagged macroeconomic  indicators  (see Impavido and Musalem (2000)).  This also
suggests that causality - if any - is more  likely to go from contractual  savings
development to bank profitability and loan maturity.  The lag may also simply reflect the
time adjustment  for the impact of contractual  savings to materialize.
26  On the contrary, econometric  analysis will show a strong negative correlation between short-tern  funds
and contractual savings development.
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Table 5 displays the results of the net interest margin regressions.  First, the NIM is
positively correlated with the capitalization  ratio, which is consistent with previous
studies (see Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga  (1999)).  It is also significantly and positively
correlated  with the structure of assets, the sources of funds and overhead  expenses.  Note
however that the last correlation probably simply reflects the financial  statement
accounting  identity.  Second,  it is negatively  correlated with  stock market liquidity, but
positively correlated with stock market activity.  Government  fiscal balances  are
negatively  correlated with net interest margin, possibly reflecting  macroeconomic
uncertainties.  Inflation and real GDP per capital growth are positively correlated with
NIM when considering cross-country  variations  (OLS) but negatively correlated with
NIM when considering  within variations  (fixed effects).  Third, the level of development
of contractual  savings institutions (LogcsfaGDP)  is negatively associated with net interest
margin  27 when concentrating on cross country variations (however within country
variation has not significant impact):  We have a logarithmic relation between contractual
savings  development and net interest margin;  this suggests that the magnitude of the
impact depends on the initial  development of contractual  savings institutions. The
impact is large at low initial level of contractual  savings  development, and it decreases  as
contractual  savings institutions develop.  Therefore,  our results are consistent with the
initial hypothesis that the development of contractual  savings institutions  is associated to
increased competitive  pressures  in the banking system, leading banks to reduce the
spreads between loan and deposit rates.
Table 6 displays the results of the profit regressions.  Note now that the correlation
between contractual  savings development and bank profits is reversed.  Indeed, while the
OLS regression does not show any significant correlation,  the fixed effect estimation
provides a positive and significant correlation between contractual  savings  development
and bank profitability.  While banks tend to choose lower spread when contractual
savings  institutions are more developed, the total impact on profit is  surprisingly positive.
In Tables 8 and 9, we show that the impact is likely to go through a reduction in credit
risk.
Loan maturity regressions  are summarized in Table 7 (these estimations  are realized on
a subset of 14 countries for which we have the information).  Note that, given the bank
level control variables included in the regressions, the results  obtained on the
LogcsfaGDP variable  do not reflect modifications  in the structure of assets or liabilities
of the banks.  First, standard measures of financial development do not seem to explain
the loan maturity,  while GDP growth and inflation do have a significant  effect.  Second,
the level of development of contractual savings  institutions has a positive and significant
effect on loan maturity.  Given the discussion in the second section,  this suggests that,
even if banks seem  to face higher competitive pressures  when contractual savings
institutions develop  (thus reducing interest spreads),  they do not reduce the maturity of
loans (in other word they do not seem to concentrate  on their core activity).  On the
27 The correlation  is weaker if we  simply take csfaGDP; this suggests that non linearities are probably
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contrary,  there seems to be a complementarity between the two institutions when
concentrating  on the loan maturity  dimension28.
In Tables 8 and 9, we show moreover that there is  a strong negative  correlation
between credit risk borne by the banking system  and the level of development of
contractual savings  institutions.  It is worthwhile underlying that this strong result does
not reflect cross-country differences,  for instance the level of economic development29.
This result complements  the conclusions  of Impavido, Musalem and Tressel (2001)  who
show that the corporate  sector is more resilient to various shocks when contractual
savings institutions are more developed  or invest more on the stock exchange.
Finally,  we show in Table  10 that, within countries,  the development of contractual
savings implies a reduction in short-term liabilities of the banking  sector.  Hence, this
result is also consistent with complementarity  between banks and contractual  savings
institutions.
IV  CONCLUDING  REMARKS
This paper is a first attempt at assessing the interaction between the banking system and
contractual  savings  institutions that have rapidly developed  over the past 20 years in
many countries.  We show that the development of contractual  saving is associated with a
more efficient banking system.  Moreover,  our results strongly support the argument that
the banking system is more resilient to liquidity and credit risks when contractual  savings
institutions are more deweloped.  They are consistent with the conclusions drawn by
Impavido, Musalem and Tressel (2001)  concerning  firms'  financing patterns.
28 For various aspects of the role of long-term  finance, see the discussion in Impavido, Musalem and
Tressel (2001).
29 Indeed, we obtain the same result in the fixed effect estimations.
- 12 -Gregorio Impavido, Alberto R. Musalem,  and Thierry  Tressel
REFERENCES
[1]  Aghion,  P., Bachetta,  P., and A. Banerjee  (2000), Currency Crisis and Monetary
Policy  in an Economy with Credit Constraints, Harvard University, mimeo.
[2]  Allen,  F., and Santomero, A.  M. (1998), The Theory of Financial Intermediation,
Journal  of Banking and Finance, 21,  1461-1485.
[31  Barth, James, Gerard Caprio and Ross  Levine  (2001)  Bank Regulation  and
Supervision:  What Works and What Doesn't, World Bank, mimeo.
[4]  Beclh  I., De  mirguc-Kunt, A.,  Levine, R., and V.  Maksimovic  (2000), Financial
Strucrurr  and Economic Development:  Firm, Industry and Country Evidence,  World
Bank Po. icy Research Working Paper,  No.  2423.
[5]  Bolton,  P.,  and X.  Freixas (2000) Equity, Bonds, and Bank Debt: Capital Structure
and Financial  Market Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information, Journal  of
Political  Economy, vol.108, No.2.
[6]  Caballero Ricardo J.  (2001)  Macroeconomic  Volatility  in Latin America:  a View
and Three Case  Studies, mimeo MIT.
[7]  Caballero Ricardo J.  and Arvind Krishnamurthy (2000) Dollarization of
Liabilities: Underinsurance  and Domestic  Financial  Development, mimeo MIT.
[8]  Caprio, Gerard, Jr.  and Asli Demirguc-Kunt  (1997)  The Role of Long Term
Finance:  Theory and Evidence,  Policy Research Department,  The World Bank.
[9]  Caprio, G.,  and L. Summers (1993)  Finance  and its Reformn,  Beyond Laissez-
Faire, World Bank Policy Research Paper  1171.
[10]  Catalan, M.,  Impavido G., and A.  R.  Musalem(2000)  Contractual  Savings or
Stock Market  Development:  Which Leads? Journal  of  Applied Social Science
Studies, 120(3): 445-87. Paper can also be downloaded from the World Bank
Pension Primer Series at http://www.worldbank.org/pensions
[  1]  Chang,  R., and A.  Velasco  (1999), Liquidity Crisis in Emerging  Markets - Theory
and Evidence, NBER  Working Paper,  No 7272.
[12]  Chen, Yehning  (1999)  Banking Panics:  The Role of the First-Come, First-Served
Rule and Information  Externalities, Journal  of  Political  Economy, Vol.  107, No.5.
[13]  Claessens,  S., Demirguc-Kunt,  A.,  and H.  Huizinga (2001), How Does Foreign
Entry Affect Domestic Bank Markets?, Journal  of  Banking and Finance,  No.25,
891-911.
[14]  Davis, E. Philip (2001) Multiple Avenues of Intermediation,  Corporate Finance and
Financial Stability, IMF Working Paper.
[15]  Davis, E. Philip and Klaus Tuori (2001) The Changing Structure of Banks'
Income,  an Empirical  Investigation.
[16]  Deckle,  R.  and K.  Kletzer (2001) Domestic Bank Regulation  and Financial
Crisis:  Theory and Empirical  Evidence from  East Asia, NBER working paper 8322.
-13  -Gregorio Impavido, Alberto  R. Musalem,  and Thierry Tressel
[17]  Demirguc-Kunt,  Asli  and Enrica Detragiache  (1997)  The Determinants of
Banking Crisis: Evidence from Developed and Developing Countries, mimeo World
Bank.
[18]  Demirguc-Kunt,  Asli  and Enrica Detragiache  (1998)  Financial Liberalization  and
Financial Fragility, mimeo World Bank.
[19]  Demirguc-Kunt,  Asli  and Enrica Detragiache  (2000) Does Deposit Insurance
Increase Banking  System Stability? An Empirical Investigation,  mimeo World
Bank.
[20]  Demirguc-Kunt,  Asli  and Harry Huizinga (1999a) Determinants of Commercial
Bank Interest Margins and Profitability:  some International Evidence,  The  World
Bank Economic Review, vol. 1  3 No.2, 379-408.
[21]  Demirguc-Kunt,  Asli  and Harry Huizinga (1999b) Financial  Structure and Bank
Profitability, mimeo World Bank.
[22]  Demirguc-Kunt,  Asli, and Ross  Levine  (1999) Bank-Based and Market Based
Financial  Systems: Cross-Country  Comparisons,  mimeo, World Bank.
[23]  Demirguc-Kunt,  Asli,  and Vojislav  Maksimovic (1996) Stock Market
Development  and Financing Choices of Firms,  The World Bank Economic Review,
vol.10,  no.2.
[24]  Dewatripont, M.,  and J.  Tirole, (1994)  The Prudential  Regulation of  Banks, The
MIT Press.
[25]  Diamond,  D., and Dybvig  (1983), Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity,
Journal  of  Political  Economy, 91,  401-419.
[26]  Diamond,  Douglas W.  (1991)  Monitoring and Reputation:  The Choice between
Bank  Loans and Directly  Placed Debt, Journal  of Political  Economy, vol.  99, no.
4.
[27]  Freixas, Xavier,  and Jean-Charles Rochet  (1997) Microeconomics of Banking,
The MIT Press.
[28]  Greene William H.  (1990) Econometric Analysis,  Second Edition, Prentice  Hall.
[29]  Grossman, S.  and J. Stiglitz, (1984) On the impossibility  of informationally
efficient markets, American Economic Review, 70,  393-408.
[30]  Harwood, A.,  Litan, R.,  and M.  Pomerleano  (eds.) Financial  Markets and
Development - The Crisis in Emerging Markets.  1999, Brookings Institution  Press,
Washington  D.C.
[31]  Holmstrom,  Bengt,  and Jean Tirole  (1993) Market Liquidity and Performance
Monitoring,  Journal of Political Economy, vol.  101,  no.  4.
[32]  Impavido, G.,  and A.  R.  Musalem (2000), Contractual  Savings, Stock and Asset
Markets,  World Bank Policy Research Paper  2490.
[33]  Impavido, Gregorio,  Musalem, Alberto  R., and Thierry Tressel (2001),
Contractual Savings,  Capital Markets and Firms' Financing Choices,  World Bank
Policy Research Paper  2186.
- 14 -Gregorio Impavido, Alberto R. Musalem,  and Thierry Tressel
[34]  Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook  OECD 2000 Edition.
1351  Koskela,  E., and R. Stenbacka (2000) Is There  a Tradeoff between Bank
Competition  and Financial Fragility? Journal  of  Banking and Finance,  No.24,  1853-
1873.
[36]  La Porta, Rafael,  Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,  Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W.
Vishny (1997) Legal Determinants  of External Finance, Journal of Finance,  no.52.
[37]  La Porta, Rafael,  Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,  Andrei Shleifer,  and Robert W.
Vishny (1998) Law and Finance, Journal  of Political  Economy, no. 106.
[38]  Levine,  Ross  (1997) Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and
Agenda, Journal  of  Economic Literature,  June.
[39]  Levine,R.  and Zervos,  S., (1998) Stock Markets and Economic Growth,  The
American Economic Review, LXXXVIII, 537-58.
[40]  Maug, E., (1998) Large  Shareholders  as Monitors:  Is There  a Trade-Off between
Liquidity and Control, The Journal  of  Finance.
[41]  OECD,  (2000) Institutional  Investors  in Latin America.
[42]  Petersen, M., and R.  Rajan(1995) The Effect of Credit Market Competition on
Lending Relationships,  The Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics.
[43]  Rajan, R.  (1992), Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and
Arm's- length Debt, Journal  of  Finance,  47,  1367- 1400.
[44]  Rey, Patrick and Joseph E.  Stiglitz(1993)  Short-term Contracts  as a Monitoring
Device, NBER  Working Paper, no.  4514.
[45]  Rodrik, D.,  and Andres Velasco  (1999) Short-term Capital Flows, mimeo Harvard
University.
[46]  Shleifer,  Andrei, and Robert W.  Vishny  (1997) A Survey of Corporate
Governance, Journal  of  Finance  52.
[47]  Stulz, Rene, (2000) Does Financial  Structure Matter for Economic Growth? A
Corporate Finance Perspective,  mimeo.
[48]  Vittas Dimitri (1999)  Pension Reform and Financial Markets, Harvard Institute for
International  Development, Development Discussion Paper no.  697.
[49]  Vittas, Dimitri (2000) Pension Reform and Capital Market Development:
Feasiblity and Impact Preconditions.  World Bank Policy Research Paper  no.  2414.
-15  -Gregorio Impavido, Alberto R. Musalem,  and Thierry Tressel
APPENDIX  A
Tabl  1: TheSani
aB  cGy  1Uin  P  hkujm=cmrm*s  Lkm  Cmm*s
- Wya  F).A$  obthmod  Re  As  PobCbtcs  FIwvdAw*  ~  t7
1  AR  110  Yes  YS  s  yVs  NY  m
2  M.STRALA  87  YEs  yes  ys  YEs  Ys  yes
3  AJSIT  149  Ye  N,  Ye  N,  Ys  N,
4  IEGLM  110  Yes  Yes  Ys  YS  Ys  YVs
5  1ABL  1E8  Yes  YES  Y_  yes  N  Nb
6  0t4YE  72  yVs  yes  Yes  yVs  YeS  yVs
7  C-.E  35  YeS  Yes  YVs  Yes  Ys  Yes
8  0341AW  105  Yes  Yes  YVs  yVs  YVs  yVs
9  FNLD  17  ys  Ys  YeS  ys  Yes  Ys
10  FRANC  516  Yesb  Yes  N,  ys  N,
11  GERVNi  2111  ys  yes  Yes  Yes  YVs  yVs
12  25  yVs  YVs  VS  Ys  YeS  YV
13  IH3NR?  31  Y  Vs  ys  YVs  YVs  yVs
14  NIA  8  YeS  YeVs  ys  Yes  Yes  yes
15  IAD  2  Ys  Yes  Ys  yVs  Yes  yVs
16  [rALY  V5  yes  ys  YES  Yes  Yes  Yes
17  JAPAN  213  yVs  tb  YeVs  N  YVs  b
18  IJF  - E8  Vs  yes  yes  yes  Yes  YeV
19  M~LAY9A  84  Yes  YVs  yVs  yVs  YVS  ys
20  KS=  47  Ys  yes  YS  Yes  YS  N
21  WHEIRBIA'IO  75  Ys  Ys  Yes  Yes  Ys  ys
22  NBNENAND  18  Ys  ys  YS  YES  Yes  Yes
23  NWAY  47  YVS  Yes  yes  s  Yys  ys
24  CF13°L  48  YVs  Y  ess  yes  Vs  Ys
25  9  CE  59  Ves  YVs  Vt  ys  YS  Ys
26  S)U1F1AFA  67  yes  Yes  YVs  Yes  yVs  YVs
27  SPAN  171  YVs  Nb  Vts  ,  YeVs  N
28  SRLN(A  12  Yes  yVs  yes  Ys  Yes  ys
22  SAE91  30  YV  yes  Ms  Ys  ES  Ys
3  SMAfli  381  yes  Ys  Ys  Yes  Yes  ys
31  TDI1  34  yVs  yes  YVs  Yes  Yes  YVs
32  7LRY  34  Vs  N,  ys  N,b  yVs  N
33  WEDNGCM  398  Ys  yVs  Yes  Yes  Ys  yes
34  UINE)SrATE;  1153  Ys  Ys  YES  Yes  YeV  Y
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Table 2: Definition of Variables
VARIABLE  DEFINITION
Banks  Characteristics
Net Interest  Margin  (NIM)  (Interest Income  -Interest Expenses)  I Total Assets
Profitability (Profit)  Total  Profit before Taxes /  Total Assets
Capitalization  (ETA)  Equity /  Total  Assets
Structure of Assets (  LTA)  Loans / Total Assets
Sources of Funds (STFTA)  Customer &  Short-term  Funding /  Total Assets
Overhead (OTTA)  Overhead  Expenses -Tax /  Total Assets
Maturty of Loans (STL)  Short-term  Loans (maturity  less than 1 year) /Totat  Loans
Non Earnings Assets (CTA)  Non Earnings Assets /  Total Assets
Credit Risk A  (LLTA)  Loan Loss Provisions I Total Assets
Credit Risk B  (LLLN)  Loan Loss Provisions /Total Loans
Macroeconomic  Factors
Inflation ( INF)  Consumer Price Index Rate of Growth
GDP  growth  rate of growth of GDP, adjusted for inflation
Log(GDP/cap)  Ln (  GDP/capita)  (constant  US $)
Budget  Balance  Central Govemment Budget  Surplus (+) I Deficit (-) (%  GDP)
Financial System Development
Credit to Private Sector (ec2)  Credit to Pnvate Sector by Financial Intermediaries  (  %  GDP)
Stock Market Capitalization (ecl2)  Stock Market Capitalization ( %  GDP)
Stock Market Activity (ec19)  Value Traded (  %  GDP )
Turnover Ratio  (TOR)  Value Traded ( %  Capitalization)
Contractual  Sav/ngs Insitutions
CS  Development (%  GDP)
(csfaGOP or Log(csfaGDP))  Pension Funds +  Life Insurance* Total Financial Assets ( %  GDP)
Life +  Non Life Insurance for Argentina  and Brazil
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Table 3: Summary Statistics (period  average)
Country  ErA  LTA  STFTA  NiM  OTTA  CTA  Profit  STL  ec2  ec12  ec19  TOR  csoaGDp  Bud Bal.  LLTA
%  34  %  -%  %  %  W.  Y.  34--3  %  34  34  %  %  %  34DP  %
Argentina  14.62  54.59  75.62  3.99  6.50  3.06  1.18  NA  28.06  16.34  4.25  30.27  2.61  -1.1o  1.56
Aust  6.45  66.91  71.80  2.36  2.26  0.76  1.38  NA  83.61  7869  31.46  38.95  s8.8  4.99  0.34
Austria  5.86  43.81  67.39  1.35  1.26  170  0.51  NA  125.62  13.87  7.16  54.12  18.70  -3.52  0.10
Bellun  3.64  3814  85.52  1.42  1.38  0.32  0.60  20.65  138.97  49.77  10.09  18.15  24.53  -4.35  0.21
Brad  8.18  33.95  62.55  6.55  9.17  1.94  0.88  NA  74.84  23.47  13.69  5627  8.15  4.67  1.15
Canada  5.69  59.81  81.09  2.05  1.91  1.17  0.96  NA  96.59  73.17  37.40  48.85  60.84  -3.80  0.53
Swterand  5.48  44.78  67.75  1.05  2.02  2.31  0.61  62.25  180.83  156.85  121.95  71.71  96.69  -1.22  0.34
Chile  6.31  49.68  59.74  2.69  2.26  7.76  -0.02  NA  64.89  96.73  9.27  9.37  42.23  1.84  0.34
G many  3.65  55.73  62.22  1.46  1.08  1.09  0.56  38.04  126.58  32.96  35.10  105.37  21.82  -1.78  0.06
Drmwk  7.15  65.34  45.49  2.18  1.18  0.69  0.78  26.16  57.62  40.56  18.41  46.56  52.06  -0.93  o.as
Spdn  6i15  48.96  76.81  2.70  1.99  2.84  1.16  NA  105.55  41.13  46.35  86.99  1298B  4.78  0.49
Flniand  5.52  48.80  74.03  1.73  1.76  0.94  0.05  31.73  72.74  69.25  24.62  33.08  43.56  -8.00  0.75
Francs  4.74  41.53  70.24  1AO  1.53  0.59  0.41  NA  103.35  46.29  24.34  51.16  29.79  -4.47  0.51
United Kingdom  5.32  52.54  75.55  2.03  2.01  1.91  1.07  26.74  122.62  135.96  54.89  39.50  132.21  -3.71  0.42
Groom  4.80  40.51  77.95  1.65  1.74  7.51  1.21  92.53  95.00  38.26  25.71  41.54  845  68.37  0.31
Hunguy  4.41  38.15  55.58  2.35  2.61  16.53  -0.81  54.94  80.26  1359  9.62  39.94  2.41  4.35  2.36
Indla  614  41.13  64.27  3.46  1.80  OA1  1.78  NA  47.98  31.60  11.15  36.48  7.23  -2.63  0.28
Ireland  7.27  56.06  77.58  2.09  1.62  1.75  1.17  27.20  69.98  28.57  3zs1  106.46  53.66  -1.33  0.24
Ilaiy  6.16  49.35  66.48  2.30  2.05  0.53  0.69  57.05  97.33  26.21  15.77  49.67  10.16  -7.75  0.47
Japan  4.44  62.32  7Z46  122  1.19  0.70  0.05  44.05  251.86  74.17  26.78  36.61  29.59  0.16  0.80
Korea  5.22  52.25  72.74  1.56  1.68  2.24  0.07  NA  73.93  38.29  59.69  165.79  22.05  -0.29  0.40
SrlLanka  6.80  44.86  54.15  3.05  2.63  7.46  1.40  NA  35.20  16.57  2.22  12.87  156.87  -6.77  049
MexIco  6.25  60.15  73.91  2.39  2.23  3.14  0.48  NA  36.96  34.12  12.37  36.82  0.63  0.63  0.62
Malaysa  7.57  52.83  85.34  215  0.88  4.28  1.02  NA  130.25  207.07  108.41  53.91  21.33  1.60  0.78
NewZealand  4.77  72.66  83.17  2.82  2.37  0.34  1.33  NA  98.74  54.38  16.52  3029  19.31  1.62  0.11
Netherlands  5.19  55.79  67.75  1.60  1.76  1.01  0.86  NA  113.14  96.18  72.92  64.23  132.58  -2.25  024
Norway  6.91  63.79  65.90  2.47  1.97  1.01  1.00  NA  79.07  30.67  18.51  57.08  29.78  -1.82  0.66
pogal  5.63  41.46  80.59  2.58  2.02  3.92  0.75  2741  89.05  27.44  14.24  42.32  10.40  NA  NA
Singapore  11.18  43.60  82.27  1.33  0.47  2.30  1.24  63.79  81.66  159.46  76.88  46.79  94.06  11.63  028
Sweden  5.15  68.54  46.94  1.63  1.11  0.55  0.44  21.80  125.93  64.09  48.84  52.53  39.84  -7.41  1. 9
Thailand  6.30  66.77  78.43  2.31  1.64  z38  -0.35  NA  130.67  57.43  38.43  72.10  3.86  1.22  1.18
Turkey  10.31  37.68  74.91  7.71  4.83  2.70  3.56  79.64  33.03  21.38  22.22  115.83  0.24  -5.67  0.41
SouthAira  7.67  86.79  82.68  3.04  2.91  1.02  1.53  NA  134.17  157.36  22.21  13.95  102.69  -5.45  6.52
UnitdStates  6.35  37.44  63.82  2.18  2.72  3.43  1.43  NA  133.24  109.05  91.32  77.08  86.99  -2.38  0.28
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Table 4:  Pairwise  Correlations
ETA  LTA  STFTA  NIM  Profit  OTTA  CTA
ETA  1
LTA  -0.0161  1
0.7717
STFTA  0.0801  0.0164  1
0.1502  0.7693
NIM  0.4629  -0.1108  0.0448  1
0  0.0455  0.4218
Profit  0.4304  -0.0825  -0.0181  0.4237  1
0  0.1386  0.7448  0
OTTA  0.4622  -0.2043  0.0368  0.6905  0.1428  1
0  0.0002  0.5092  0  0.0101
CTA  -0.0217  -0.2578  -0.1733  -0.0088  -0.0065  0.0316  1
0.6976  0  0.0017  0.8744  0.9069  0.5704
STL  0.2065  -0.6058  0.2039  0.2517  0.1798  0.3336  0.2593
0.0214  0  0.0231  0.0048  0.0457  0.0002  0.0036
LLTA  0.14  0.0795  0.0554  0.193  -0.4666  0.2647  0.0095
0.0133  0.1612  0.3308  0.0006  0  0  0.8678
LLLN  0.1376  -0.0939  0.0408  0.2244  -0.4432  0.3275  0.0516
0.015  0.0979  0.4744  0.0001  0  0  0.3651
ec2  -0.3393  0.1425  0.1167  -0.3363  -0.1954  -0.2887  -0.1226
0  0.0171  0.0515  0  0.001  0  0.0407
ec12  0.0212  0.0587  0.1681  -0.2161  0.1188  -0.247  -0.0459
0.7182  0.3185  0.0041  0.0002  0.0433  0  0.4363
ecIg  -0.0116  -0.0683  0.0392  -0.2017  0.1271  -0.205  -0.0315
0.8441  0.2462  0.5067  0.0005  0.0307  0.0005  0.5935
TOR  -0.0383  -0.0591  -0.0606  0.0028  0.1148  -0.0373  -0.0961
0.5154  0.3161  0.3048  0.962  0.0513  0.5272  0.1032
LogCSfa,%GDP  -0.2026  0.2006  0.0259  -0.5857  -0.2577  -0.434  -0.253
0.0032  0.0035  0.7095  0  0.0002  0  0.0002
Csfa,%GDP  0.0204  0.1166  0.1019  -0.2648  0.0233  -0.187  -0.1611
0.7691  0.092  0.1413  0.0001  0.7375  0.0066  0.0195
STL  LLTA  LLLN  *c2  *c12  ec19  TOR
STL  1
LLTA  -0.046  1
0.6123
LLLN  0.0419  0.9613  1
0.6442  0
ec2  -0.1445  -0.024  -0.066  1
0.1413  0.6949  0.2809
*c12  0.0761  -0.19  -0.1967  0.3627  1
0.4297  0.0014  0.0009  0
Oc19  0.2208  -0.1593  -0.1462  0.3224  0.7544  1
0.021  0.0076  .0144  0  0
TOR  0.1792  -0.1032  -0.0878  0.0203  -0.0204  0.4393  1
0.0622  0.0849  0.1429  0.7352  0.727  0
LogCSfa,%GDP  -0.4895  -0.1504  -0.2295  0.3929  0.571  0.3587  -0.2162
0  0.0327  0.001  0  0  0  0.0017
Csfa,%GDP  -0.2067  -0.1795  -0.2355  0.2947  0.7248  0.5148  -0.1285
0.0592  0.0106  0.0007  0  0  0  0.0644
note: p-values  are in italic
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Figure 1:  Maturity of Loans and Contractual  Savings
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Figure 2: Net Interest Margin and Contractual Savings






Regression  Line:  NIM  = -0.60  (-10.78) * Log(Csfa,%GDP)+1.47  (R2=0.35)
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Figure 3: Credit Risk and Contractual Savings
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Table 5: Contractual Savings Institutions
and Bank Net Interest Margins
Pooled and Panel  Estimates
Dependent Variable:  Net Interest Margin
Explanatory Variables:  OLS  Fixed Effects
CS variable  dated t-1  IV  dated t-1  IV
Banks' Characteristics:
Capitalization (ETA)  0.112  0.106**  0.15w  0.153*
607  5.85  9.99  10.61
Structure of Assets ( LTA)  0.031  **  0.0307  **C  0.038 *  0.039
13.53  12.75  10.69  10.82
Sources of Funds (STFTA)  0.008 **  0.007  0.005  0.006 *
3.33  3.02  1.69  1.91
Non Earnings Assets (CTA)  -0.007  -0.014  0.027 ***  0.012
-0.53  -1.72  295  0.60
Overhead  (OTTA)  0.377 ***  0.388  0.533  0.526
9,01  8.50  8.77  8.91
Macroeconomic  Factors:
Inflation  0.038 **  0.043 **  -0.028 ***  -0.032
5.46  6.55  -2.82  -3.03
GDP growth  0.035**  0.048  -0.016  -0.021  **
2.33  3.61  -1.55  -1.85
Log (GDP/Capita)  -0.03  -0.05  -0.12  -0.09
-0.47  -0.72  -0.54  0.42
Government Budget  Balance (%  GDP)  -0.03 *  -0.031  -0.016 *  -0.021  **
-3.71  -3.88  -1.63  -2.17
Financial System Development:
Credit to Private Sector  -0.0010  -0.0007  -0.005 **  -0.008
.1.00  -0.68  -2.18  -2.83
Stock Market  Capitalization  -0.0008  -0.0016  0.0008  0.0010
-0.57  -1.12  0.55  0.72
Stock Market Activity  0.0023  0.0030  0.0037 **  0.0034
1,28  1.64  2.69  2.57
Stock Market Liquidity  -0.0026  **  -0.0032  ***  -0.0029 **  -0.0027
(Turnover  Ratio)  .2.16  -2.64  -3.39  .3.01
Contractual  Savings Development  -0.171  *  -0. 17  ***  0.061  0.189
( Log of financial assets, %  GDP)  -4.26  -4.27  0.47  1.39
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Wald  Test  1140.75 (20)  1162 (20)  3660.1  (48)  3865 (48)
Nb  of Observations  156  153  156  153
Nb  of Years  7  7  7  7
Nb of Countries  30  30  30  30
Method of estimation:
GLS,  with heteroscedastic error structure and no autocorrelation within panel; no cross-sectional correlation.
Instruments  dated t-1 for contractual savings variable:
dependent variable,  real GDP  per capita growth, rate of change of M2/GDP,  rate of change of real effective  exchange rate,
volatility of inflation, volatility of interest rate,  openness, share of the population over 64,  bank  credit, market capitalization and liquidity
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Table 6: Contractual  Savings Institutions
and Bank Profitability
Pooled and Panel Estimates
Dependent  Variable:  Profitability (Profit before  Tax I Total Assets)
Explanatory Variables:  OLS  Fixed Effects
CS variable  dated t-1  IV  dated t-1  IV
Banks' Characteristics:
Capitalization  (ETA)  0.126 ***  0.127  0.281  0.289
6.06  5.96  10.19  10.11
Structure of Assets ( LTA)  0.021  0.0205 *  -0.013  -0.012 **
7.11  6.94  -2.41  -210
Sources of Funds (STFTA)  0.016  0.017 *  0.0048  0.0056
5.65  5.54  0.86  0.93
Non  Earnings Assets (CTA)  0.022  0.024  0.012  -0.006
Z85  2.88  2.45  -.29
Overhead (OQUA)  0.033  0.035  -0.219  -0.246
0.58  0.60  -2.59  -293
Macroeconomic  Factors:
Inflation  0.056  0.056  0.0195  0.033 **
7.57  7.51  1.42  2.05
GDP growth  0.066  0.065  0.038  0.056
3.924  3.89  2596  3.218
Log (GDP/Capita)  0.27 ***  0.308  1.18  1**  i.12 ***
2.663  2.894  a319  3.202
Govemment Budget Balance (%  GDP)  -0.013  -0.015  -0.008  -0.014
-1.351  -1.525  -0.586  -0.967
Financial System  Development:
Credit to Private Sector  0.0036 ***  0.0037  -0.0139***  -0.0138***
3.39  3.40  -3.88  -3.09
Stock Market Capitalization  -0.00076  -0.00024  -0.00066  -0.00027
-0.46  40.144  -0.371  40.138
Stock  Market Activity  0.0029  0.0025  0.0020  0.0013
1.47  1.28  1.19  0.74
Stock Market Liquidity  -0.002 ***  -0.0019  -0.0011  -0.001
(Tumover  Ratio)  -2.61  -2.26  -1.19  -0.64
Contractual  Savings Development  0.313  -0.239  0.31  *  0.316
( Log of financial assets, %  GDP)  0.096  -0.478  1.87  1.61
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Wald Test  418.9  (20)  405.46 (20)  1202 (48)  1117.85  (48)
Nb of Observations  156  153  156  153
Nb  of Years Included  7  7  7  7
Nb of Countries  30  30  30  30
Method of estimation:
GLS,  with hetemscedastic  error stivcture and no autocorrelation  within panel; no cross-sectional correlation.
Instruments dated t-1  for  contractual savings  variable:
contractual savings variable, real GDP per rapita growth, rate  of change of M2VGDP,  rate of change of real effective exchange rate,
volatlity of inflabon, volatility of interest rate, openness, share of the populabon over 64, bank credit market capitalizabon and liquidity
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Table 7: Contractual  Savings Institutions
and  Bank Loan Maturity
Pooled and Panel Estimates
Dependent Variable:  Loan Maturity (Short-term Loans I Total Loans)
Explanatory Variables:  OLS  Fibed Effects
CS  variable  dated ti-  rIv  dated t1  IV
Banks' Characteristics:
Capitalization  (ETA)  -0.727  -0.822  0.776  1.414
-0.66  -0.71  0.99  1.82
Structure of Assets ( LTA)  -0.026  0.169  -1.024 ***  -1.305
-0.05  0.32  -2.74  -3.23
Sources of Funds (STFTA)  0.577  *  0.496  0.259  0.503
1.82  1.33  0.93  1i70
Non  Eamings Assets (CTA)  -0.046  -0.570  -0.725  0.665
-0.07  -0.66  -2.33  1.05
Overhead  (OTTA)  -3.61  -2.38  -11.19*  -11.81
-0.85  -0.55  -3.07  -2.86
Macroeconomic  Factors:
Inflation  -0.543  -1.059  -1.96***  -1.82
-1.04  -1.62  -4.81  -3.34
GDP growth  -0.334  -0.707  -1.48***  -1.35
-0.42  -0.83  -2.84  -1.93
Log  (GDP/Capita)  -10.34  -30.96 **  -32.59  - -30.28
-0.92  -1.86  -2.59  -2.29
Govemment Budget  Balance (%  GDP)  0.727  1.237  1.738  - 2.108
1.04  1.52  3.04  141
Financial System  Development:
Credit to Private Sector  -0.033  -0.003  0.208  0.258
-0.45  -0.03  1.46  1.23
Stock Market Capitalization  -0.100  -0.217  -0.068  -0.090
-0.82  -1.49  -0.64  -0.82
Stock Market Activity  0.544 **  0.676  0.315***  0.311
347  3.97  2.82  270
Stock Market Liquidity  -0.081  -0.106  -0.104  -0.135
(Tumover Ratio)  -0.86  -1.08  -2.87  -3.39
Contractual  Savings Development  -11.98  ---  -10.86 **  -8.123  -11.9
( Log of financial assets, %  GDP)  -2.94  -2.19  -1.48  -1.84
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Wald Test  193.73 (19)  165 (23)  4660.5  (32)  2329 (33)
Log  Likelihood  -237.36  -235.13  -154.5  -153.51
Nb of Observations  67  65  67  65
Nb of Years  6  6  6  6
Nb of Countries  14  14  14  14
Method of estimatiorr
GLS,  with heteroscedastic error structure and no autocorretation  within panel; no cross-sectional correlation.
Instruments dated t-1 for contractual savings variable:
dependent variable, real GDP  per capita growth, rate ot change of M2/GDP,  rate ot change of real effective exchange rate,
volatilty of inflation, volatility ot interest  rate, openness,  share of the  population over 64,  bank credit, market capitalization and liquidity
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Table 8: Contractual  Savings Institutions
and Bank Credit Risk
Pooled and Panel Estimates
Dependent Variable:  Loan Loss Provisions I Total Assets
Explanatory Variables:  OLS  Fixed Effects
CS variable  dated t-1  IV  dated t-1  IV
Banks  Characteristics:
Capitalization  (ETA)  0.048  0.056  -0.063  -0.064
3.73  4.40  -4.31  -4.48
Structure of Assets ( LTA)  0.0031  0.0028  0.012  0.010
2.02  1.85  6.28  5.00
Sources of Funds (STFTA)  -0.002 *  -0.002  -0.004 *  -0.005
-1.66  -1.34  -1.77  -1.95
Non Eamings Assets (CTA)  0.0039  0.0038  0.004 **  0.011
0.82  0.93  1.85  1.13
Overhead (OTTA)  0.044  0.027  0.16 ***  0.17
2.44  1.42  4.25  4.63
Macroeconomic  Factors:
Inflation  -0.028  -0.027  -0.025 ***  -0.025
-4.60  -6.38  -3.72  -3.54
GDP  growth  -0.059 **  -0.055  ***-0.037  -0.033
40.22  -6.23  -4.87  -4.29
Log (GDP/Capita)  -0.167***  -0.175  0.105  0.040
-3.01  -3.14  0.74  0.30
Government Budget Balance (%  GDP)  -0.026  -0.028  -0.014  -0.009
-4.47  -4.66  -Z06  1.34
Financial System Development:
Credit to Private Sector  -0.0017  -0.0016  0.016  - 0.018
-3.02  -2.89  8.55  8.98
Stock Market Capitalization  0.0009  0.0003  -0.002 *  -0.0023
1.042  0.364  -2.159  -2.796
Stock Market Activity  0.0008  0.0013  0.0025  0.0031
0.86  1.36  3.04  4.02
Stock Market Liquidity  0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0009 *  -0.001
(Tumover Ratio)  0.12  -0.183  -1.713  -208
Contractual Savings Development  -0.0017 ***  -0.0013 **  -0.0042 **  -o.o0e4
( Financial assets, %  GDP)  -Z86  -2.30  -2.11  -a40
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Wald Test  290.5 (20)  289.3  (20)  1412 (48)  1841.3 (48)
Nb of Observations  153  151  153  151
Nb of Years  Included  7  7  7  7
Nb of Countries  30  30  30  30
Method of  estimation:
GLS,  with heteroscedastic error structure  and no autocoirelation within panel, no cross-sectional correlation.
Instruments dated t-1  for contractual savings variable:
contractual savings variable, real GDP per capita growth, rate of change of M2/GDP,  rate of change of real effective exchange rate,
volatlity of inflation, volablity of interest rate, openness, share of the population  over 64,  bank credit. market  capitalizaton and liquidity
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Table 9: Contractual Savings  Institutions
and Bank Credit Risk
Pooled and Panel  Estimates
Dependent Variable:  Loan Loss Provisions I Loans
Explanatory Variables:  OLS  Fbxed Effects
CS variable  dated  t-1  IV  dated t-i  IV
Banks  Characteristics:
Capitalization (ETA)  0.07  0.08  -0.12 **  -0.13
3.31  3.80  -4.95  -5.41
Structure of Assets ( LTA)  -0.02  -0.02 *  -0.02 *  -0.02 "*
-7.25  -7.47  -6.91  -7.55
Sources of Funds (STFTA)  -0.01  ***  -0.01  ***  -0.004  -0.003
-2.99  -2.68  -0.82  -0.75
Non Eamings Assets (CTA)  0.005  0.003  0.006  0.014
0.43  0.33  0.73  0.70
Overhead  (OTTA)  0.26 ***  0.26 ***  0.55 ***  0.53 ***
9.06  9.83  8.37  8.42
Macroeconomic  Factors:
Inflation  -0.06 *  -0.06  -0.05 ***  -0.04
-7.77  -7.75  -3.76  -3.56
GDP growth  -0.11  ***  -0.10 ***  -0.07 ***  -0.07
-6.38  -6.31  -5.41  -5.54
Log (GDP/Capita)  -0.27  **  -0.30 *  0.50 **  0.56 *
-2.86  -3.16  1.99  2.38
Government Budget Balance (%  GDP)  -0.04 *  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01
43.959  -3.912  -1.084  4O.824
Financial System  Development:
Credit to Private Sector  -0.004 *  -0.005  0.028  0.029 **
-4.65  -4.53  9.18  9.66
Stock Market Capitalization  0.003 *  0.002  -0.0005  -0.0009
1.85  1.14  -0.34  -0.61
Stock Market Activity  0.0006  0.0014  0.001  0.003
0.36  0.89  0.96  2.08
Stock Market Liquidity  0.0014  0.0011  -0.0009  -0.0007
(Tumover Ratio)  1.16  0.92  -0.999  -0.83
Contractual Savings Development  -0.0036 **  -0.003  -0.017  ***  -0.021
( Financial assets, %  GDP)  -4.00  -3.35  -4.60  -6.35
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Wald Test  676.5 (20)  1190.2 (20)  2088 (48)  2411 (48)
Nb of Observations  153  153  153  151
Nb of Years Induded  7  7  7  7
Nb of Countries  30  30  30  30
Method of  estimation:
GLS,  with heteroscedastic error stnrctuare  nd no autocorrelation within panel; no cross-sectional correlation.
Instruments dated t-1 for contractual savings  variable:
contractual savings variable, real GDP  per capita growth, rate of change of M21GDP,  rate of change of real effective  exchange rate,
volatility of inflation, volatility of interest rate, openness, share of the population over 64, bank credit,  market capitalization and liquidity
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Table  10: Contractual  Savings Institutions
and  Bank Liabilities
Pooled and Panel Estimates
Dependent Variable:  Customer and Short-term Funding I Total Asset
Explanatory Variables:  OLS  Fixed Effects
CS variable  dated f-I  IV  dated t-I  IV
Banks' Characteristics:
Capitalization  (ETA)  -0.134  -0.331  -0.32  -0.48
-0.34  -0.82  .0.89  -1.32
Structure of Assets ( LTA)  -0.18  -0.19 ***  0.1  0.11
-2.72  -2.89  1.36  1.61
Non Eamings Assets (CTA)  -0.89  -1.11  **  -0.24  0.3
-3.93  -8.10  -3.5  1.4
Overhead (OQTA)  1.469  1.591  5.06  *  4.71
1.51  1.61  5.67  5.39
Macroeconomic  Factors:
Inflation  -0.07  -0.05  0.41  0.19
-0.80  -0.52  2.52  1.07
GDP growth  0.02  0.10  0.53 ***  0.33**
0.07  0.40  3.89  2.23
Log (GDP/Capita)  -5.44  -6.05 **  -13.61  **'  -14.61
-3.41  -3.65  -3.37  -3.85
Government Budget Balance (%  GDP)  0.62 ***  0.66 ***  0.36  0.22
3.51  3.67  2.19  1.18
Financial System Development:
Credit to Private Sector  0.01  0.01  -0.11  *  -0.19
0.33  0.45  -3.43  -3.76
Stock Market Capitalization  0.04  0.03  0.01  0.03
1.34  0.98  0.77  1.38
Stock Market Activity  -0.05  -0.04  -0.01  -0.02
-1.34  -1.00  -0.61  4.95
Stock Market Liquidity  -0.021  -0.034  -0.004  0.001
(Tumover Ratio)  -1.01  -1.52  -0.25  0.07
Contractual Savings Development  0.01  0.01  -0.14 *  -0.11 **
( Financial assets, %  GOP)  0.44  0.37  -2.95  -2.26
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Wald Test  123.14  (19)  163.1  (19)  4153 (47)  4632 (47)
Nb of Observations  156  153  156  153
Nb of Years Included  7  7  7  7
Nb of Countries  30  30  30  30
Method of estimation:
GLS, with heteroscedastic  error structure and no autocofrelation within panel; no cross-sectional correlation.
Instruments  dated t-1  for contractual  savings variable:
contractual  savings variable, real GDP per capita growth, rate of change of M2/GDP, rate of change of real effective exchange rate,
volatility of infation, volafility of interest rate, openness, share  of the population over 64, bank credit, market capitalization and liqu'idity
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